COMPANIES, INDUSTRIES, AND THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC SEGMENTATION*
Recent attention given to the issue of economic and labor market segmentation has generated a great deal of theoretical discussion specifying how the "structural" level of analysis, which focuses on economic and organizational characteristics of the workplace, is distinct from previous "individualistic" accounts, which have focused on the characteristics of workers (Horan et al., 1980) . However, in the rush to stake out new intellectual territory, relatively less attention has been paid to the equally serious issue of the competing levels at which economic structure can be conceptualized and measured. The central issue , here concerns the use of company-as opposed to industry-level measures of economic structure. Companies are frequently argued to be the "ultimate" level of economic segmentation because they define labor markets and concentrations of economic power (Averitt, 1968) , and because they specify organizational characteristics such as level of bureaucratization (Stolzenberg, 1978) . However, because of a lack of company-level data, most researchers have relied on industry-or plant-level measures and have argued that these are ac-* Direct all correspondence to: Randy Hodson, Department of Sociology, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712.
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Thus, the debate about industry versus enterprise as the appropriate unit of analysis for the study of economic segmentation has generally been constructed as a debate about measurement rather than as a debate about conceptualization. I would like to suggest that the leading question of this debate is incorrectly posed. Neither companies nor industries are ultimately the "correct" unit of analysis. Both companies and industries have meaningful consequences for labor force outcomes. Indeed, much of the prior literature on economic structure recognizes this fact (see Rees, 1962; and Cornfield and Sullivan, 1979) , but recent work on economic segmentation has been unwilling to grapple seriously with level of economic segmentation as an important theoretical issue. Only by addressing the conceptual problems surrounding this issue can we begin to specify adequately the role of economic structure in determining labor force outcomes.
PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Many discussionsk of economic segmentation specify companies as the conceptual unit. Doeringer and Piore (1971) argue that the core economic sector is cbmposed of companies with large scale and highly structured labor markets, or more specifically, by sets of jobs comprising internal labor markets within these companies. Similarly, Thurow's (1975) conception of job queues specifies labor markets within companies as the theoretical unit of analysis. Many empirical studies have tried to American Sociological Review, 1984, Vol. 49 (June:335-348) follow this specification. For example, Stolzenberg (1978) and Baron and Bielby (1980) utilize respondents' self-reports of their employers' characteristics as the empirical basis for studying economic segmentation.
The primacy of companies over industries as economic units is frequently argued in terms of the growing importance of conglomerates that cross-cut industry boundaries. These firms possess many of the same resources of market power held by oligopolistic or monopolistic companies and are responsible for much of the continuing increase in the concentration of economic ownership in the United States (Mueller, 1970; Scherer, 1970) . The increasing importance of these conglomerates is said to obviate industries as conceptual units. Market power, labor markets, working conditions, and so on, are argued to follow conglomerate boundaries rather than to follow industrial 'product divisions.
Conversely, Bluestone et al. (1973) argue that barriers to the mobility of capital and labor create distinct core and periphery economies defined along the boundaries of traditional industrial categories. Accordingly, they make policy recommendations in terms of the redevelopment of "low-wage industries." Ross and Gbldner (1950) argue that industrial differences in productivity, economic concentration, unionization, and in the magnitude of payroll as a portion of total costs make industries extremely important in the determination of wage structures. Rees (1962) further argues that industrial characteristics are consequential for the growth or decline of trade unions and suggests that unions fail or succeed on an industry-by-industry basis. Empirical studies in industrial relations have traditionally used industries as the unit of analysis for topics ranging from the effects of concentration on wages (Weiss, 1966; Haworth and Reuther, 1978) to the study of labor force mobility (Alexander, .
Sociologists have also been cognizant of the importance of industries as social entities that define important economic relations. (See, for example, Wallace and Kalleberg's [I9821 study of the decline of skilled trades in the printing industry.) Indeed, in many ways the analysis of specific industries has been central to the intellectual focus on underdeveloped sectors of the economy (Bluestone, 1970; Gordon, 1972; Sullivan, 1978) .
The growth of such conglomerates also raises questions about the meaning of companies as units of analysis. In particular, is the company defined by the semi-autonomous subsidiary, the national parent corporation, or perhaps by the larger owning unit of the multinational corporation?
In addition to companies and industries, plants and shops have also served as units of conceptualization and measurement in the study of economic segmentation. This has been most common in the complex-organizations literature. For example, Blau et al. (1976) utilize a sample of 110 manufacturingplants in their study of technology and organizational structure. Similarly; Hrebiniak (1974) relates technology and work-group structure within different departments of the same organization. In this conceptualization, the plant or shop level of analysis is deemed essential because only at this level does the intersection of company characteristics and industrial production processes become specified in terms of definite forms of the organization of work.
UNTANGLING THE ISSUES
The above brief review suggests that plants, companies, and industries all define social relations that may be of potential interest to sociologists. To untangle the effects of these levels of economic structure it is necessary to evaluate similar measures of economic characteristics across multiple levels of economic structure. In the absence of this kind of analysis it is difficult to inform this debate with empirical evidence. The basic project of this paper, then, is to construct models of economic structure and evaluate these at both the company and industry levels. Wage and salary earnings will be selected as the dependent variable for this analysis because of the centrality of this worbplace outcome.
A minimum set of dimensions of economic structure includes plant size, economic scale, capital intensity, concentration, profit rate, conglomerate domination, and foreign holdings Kaufman et al., 1981; Tolbert et al., 1980) . Measures of these dimensions of economic structure will be constructed and evaluated at both the company and industry levels. Plant size is argued to have a positive effect on earnings because of premiums paid to workers to compensate for the harsh and alienating conditions of large plants, and because of the possibilities for collective power among workers offered by the conditions of mass production . Economic scale is also argued to influence workers' earnings positively, in this case because of the greater financial resources available to large companies. Motivated by the need to secure cooperation from otherwise alienated or even rebellious workers, large employers may use part of their resources to pay premium wages (Reich et a]., 1973) .2 Capital intensity is Economists additionally argue that large size also seen as an important positive influence on employees' earnings (Bluestone, 1970) . The effect of capital intensity is argued to occur through heightened productivity (Ross and Goldner, 1950) , through heightened employee responsibility for the care and maintenance (or, potentially, the abuse and sabotage) of expensive capital equipment (Blauner, 1964) , and through a lessened importance of wages in proportion to the total costs of production (0' Connor, 1973) .
Competing explanations exist concerning the role of concentration in wage determination. As one of a cluster of characteristics that define core industries, concentration is hypothesized to have a positive effect on workers' earnings (Tolbert et al., 1980) . However, it has also been noted that concentrated industries are often the hardest industries to unionize, a constraint that may depress wages (Levinson, 1967) .
High rates of profit are argued to produce high wages because of the availability of resources to meet wage demands (Gordon, 1972) . Conglomerate domination is argued to result in lower wages because of the exploitation of subsidiary firms (and, indirectly, their employees) by parent enterprises (Averitt, 1968; Bluestone and Harrison, 1982) . Finally, foreign holdings are argued to result in high wages because of a limited sharing of the superprofits of economic imperialism with home country employees in order to create a domestic "labor aristrocracy" as a base of support for further military and economic expansion abroad (Barnet and Muller, 1974; Mandel, 1975) .
Besides specifying meaningful dimensions of economic segmentation in and of themselves, the above economic characteristics are also frequently argued to define distinct economic sectors with differentiated processes of economic attainment (Averitt, 1968; Stolzenberg, 1978; Hodson, 1978 : Tolbert et al., 1980 . Accordingly, it is also necessary to evaluate categorical models of economic segmentation at both the company and industry levels. Hodson's (1978) empirically based dual economy categorization will b e utilized a s o u r industry-level model of economic segmentat i~n .~ An analogous company-level model will also be developed for purposes of comparison across measurement levels (see "Data and frequently produces economies of scale which may result in greater productivity per employee and in heightened wages.
Hodson's (1978) dual economy model was selected because of its sole reliance on characteristics of economic structures rather than on both economic and labor force characteristics (cf. Tolbert et al., 1980). Methods" below). In addition, because of recent criticisms concerning limitations of the dual economy model (Bridges, 1980; Zucker and Rosenstein, 1981; Hodson and Kaufman, 1982) , a tripartite sectoral model will also be evaluated at both the company and industry levels. This tripartite model of economic segmentation will be based on the central concept of corporate power in relation to employees, other enterprises or industries, and the community as a whole. The three sectors defined by the concept of corporate power are a monopoly sector, comprised of companies or industries with great national influence, a regional sector, comprised of companies or industries with influence beyond the local level, and a local sector, comprised of companies or industries with minimal power to mold their environments (see Hodson, 1983) . Wages and conditions are expected to parallel these economic sectors, with monopoly-sector workers having the highest earnings, local-sector workers having the lowest earnings, and regionalsector workers having an intermediate level of earnings.
DATA AND METHODS
The evaluation of these expectations across both the company and industry levels of analysis requires a data set that reports both the company and the industry of employees. Data for this purpose are provided by the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study of Schooling and Attainments. This data set is comprised of a one-third random sample of the Wisconsin high school graduating class of 1957. Extensive data were collected on these respondents at the time of high school graduation, as well as during two follow-up studies, the latest in 1975. In the 1975 survey, respondents were asked a series of questions concerning their current employment, including the name of their employer as well as their industry of e m p l~y m e n t .~ (See Sewell and Hauser [I9751 for evidence establishing the comparability of this sample to similarly constrained national samples, and Clarridge et al. [I9771 for a discussion of the 1975 follow-up study .)
Information collected about these companies and industries provides the empirical basis for evaluation of our models of economic structure and labor force earnings. The availability of these data provides a unique opportunity to inform the debate on levels of measurement of economic structure with empirical evidence. The sample selected for analysis is comprised of all private-sector employees with wage and salary earnings of $100 or more in 1974.
Company Data
Plant employment size is based on respondents' reports of the "number of people who work a t t h e place where you work." Company-level data for the employers named by respondents were collected from a variety of business and trade sources (see Hodson, 1983) . Company size ,is measured as a standardized scale based on company sales, assets, net worth, and employment. Capital intensity is measured as assets per employee. Corporate concentration is measured by the number of domestic subsidiaries owned by a given compan^.^ Profit rate is measured by net income over net worth and provides a measure of returns to capital. Conglomerate domination is measured by whether or not the employing company is the subsidiary of a larger company. This variable taps vertical and horizontal integration as well as cross-industry conglomerate ownership. Finally, foreign holdings are measured by the number of foreign subsidiaries owned by a given company . 6 Substantial missing-data problems exist for the company data. These problems arise because many of the employers named were too small to have publicly available data, And, although several relatively comprehensive sources were utilized, such as bank credit reference manuals and state-level employee compensation lists, these sources provided only very incomplete data on small companies. This problem was addressed by replacing missing data for the company variables with the mean of the variable and creating a quality-of-data measure for each variable, deWe were unable to construct a more direct mea-, sure of concentration based on share of an industry's sales by each company because of the difficulty of allocating the sales of many large companies to industry-specific categories. Since this measure is not directly comparable to the industry-level measure of concentration, conclusions concerning differences in the role of concentration at the company and industry levels must be drawn with a certain amount of reserve.
Plant employment, the component variables for company size, capital intensity, concentration, and foreign holdings were all transformed by the natural logarithm function to reduce statistical problems associated with large positive outliers. noting whether the data were observed or had ,been allocated. These quality-of-data measures can be interpreted as specifying whether or not the company was large enough to have publicly available data. Each variable and its qualityof-data measure can then be used in conjunction to tap as much as possible of the true variance and covariance of the variable (Maddala, 1977) . ' Company sectors were constructed utilizing two categorical variables. Employers listed on any of the 1974 Fortune m?gazine lists of largest United States corporations were classified as monopoly-sector employers.
Companies not so listed were classified as competitive-sector employers. To construct tripartite sectors, competitive-sector employers were further classified on the basis of whether or not they had operations in more than one city. Competitive-sector companies that had operations in more than one city were classified as regional-sector employers. Companies that had only one plant, or had plants in only one city (such as a local chain of dry cleaning stores), were classified as local-sector employers.
Industry Data
Industry data were collected for all the industries listed in the 1970 Census Industry Classification. (See Hodson [I9831 for details on this coding operation and the sources used.) Plant employment size is measured as the average employment of plants in a given industry. Company size is again measured as the average of four standardized components tapping average company sales, assets, net worth, and employment. Capital intensity is measured as average company assets per employee. Concentration is measured as the percentage of industry sales controlled by the top eight firms in the industry. Profit rate is measured as industry average net income divided by net worth. Conglomerate domination is measured as the percentage of industry employment in,which the parent company is located in some other industry. (Thus, if 709ercent of the employees in an industry work for enterprises that are owned by parent companies headquartered in other industries, then that industry has a score For the company variables, an average of 35.7% of the data were initially coded as missing. The industry data have substantially less missing data at 13.0% but suffer from problems of aggregation across certain industrial categories (see also footnote 18). Mean values were also used to replace missing industry data, but no quality-of-data measures were constructed for the industry variables because of the lesser number of cases involved. of 70 percent, indicating that it is highly dominated by outside conglomerates.) Foreign holdings are measured as a standardized scale based on foreign tax credits and foreign divid e n d~.~ The company and industry variables measuring plant employment size, company size, capital intensity, and profit rate are measured in exactly the same manner, with the only difference being the level of measurement. The company and industry variables measuring concentration, conglomerate domination, and foreign holdings are operationalized in slightly different manners across levels of measurement due either to different meanings of the constructs across levels or to different data availabilities. Accordingly, greater care must be taken in the comparison of effects across the company and industry levels for these latter variables.
As noted above, the industry-level, dual economy model of economic segmentation to be evaluated in this paper is based on the work of Hodson (1978) . Tripartite industry sectors were constructed using variables analogous to those used in the construction of the tripartite company sectors. Industries with concentration levels greater than 25 percent were classified as monopoly-sector industries. Industries with concentration levels less than or equal to 25 percent but which had more than an average of 1.1 plants per company were classified as regional-sector industries. Industries with an average of 1.1 or fewer plants per company were classified as local-sector industries.9
In order to compare the relative importance of the various dimensions of economic segmentation at the company and industry levels, we will evaluate the standardized regression betas of the economic-structure measures under a series of earnings determination models.lo To compare thk company-and AS with the company variables, the measures of plant size, company size, capital intensity, and foreign holdings were transformed by the natural logarithm function to reduce statistical problems associated with large positive outliers.
The detailed industries allocated to each tripartite industry sector are reported in Appendix Table 1 . The monopoly sector is-comprised primarily of manufacturing industries. The regional sector contains industries from each major industry group except retail. The local sector contains industries from all major industry groups but is most strongly typified by retail and service industries.
l o The natural logarithm transformation of earnings will be utilized in this analysis because past research has shown this earnings function to have desirable properties for statistical analysis and substantive interpretation.
industry-level sectoral measures, we will evaluate their ability to differentiate labor force characteristics and outcomes. In addition, we will directly compare the correlations of the analogous company and industry variables and the cross-tabulation of the company and industry sectors.
Controls for Labor Force Characteristics
Several variables measuring labor force characteristics will be utilized in parts of the analysis. These variables include gender, years of education completed, months of tenure with the current employer, class position based on authority at the workplace (see Wright, 1978) , occupational prestige (Siegel, 1971) , union membership, hours worked last week, and weeks worked last year. Given the broad sample definition, these variables, especially weeks, hours, and gender, are expected to have substantial effects on earnings.
RESULTS
The correlations of the company and industry variables with log individual earnings are presented in Table 1 . The largest earnings correlation is that involving plant employment. Sizable correlations also exist for company size and for industry average scale, capital intensity, concentration and foreign holdings. All correlations are in the expected direction except those for industry average profit rate, which has a negative sign, and industry-level conglomerate domination, which has a positive sign. The explanation for these unexpected results may reside in the intercorrelations of these variables with other dimensions of economic structure. That is, low average net worth in industries typified by small enterprises may result in high apparent profit rates on net worth. If the negative earnings effect of small scale is also operational in these industries, then the beta coefficient for profit rate should switch signs when the effects of profit rate are calculated net of economic scale. Similarly, the positive earnings correlation of conglomerate domination may result from a greater frequency of interindustry ownership in manufacturing and other relatively high-wage industries and may be eliminated when controls are added for the other dimensions of economic structure.
The intercorrelations between analogous company and industry variables are largest for company size, plant employment, capital intensity, and foreign holdings. However, even these correlations average only about .5. These relatively modest correlations suggest that these measures may very well be tapping dif- ferent aspects of economic structure at each level.
Standardized betas for the regression of the economic-structure variables on log individual earnings under several different models are resented in Table 2 . Model 1 evaluates the set bf company measures simultaneously. Plant employment, company size, and capital intensity have strong positive net effects on earnings, with plant employment having the largest coefficient by a factor of over three to one.I2
The industry-level measures of economic structure are evaluated as a group in Model 2 of Table 2 . All of the industry-level measures of economic segmentation have significant effects on earnings except average plant employment, with capital intensity having the largest effect by a factor of 1.7 to one. Industry average profit rate is now observed to have a significant positive effect on earnings in contrast to its negative zero-order correlation with earnings. However, industry-level conglomerate domination still has a positive effect in contradisl l These low correlations may also partially be a result of measurement error between the company and industry-level measures and the underlying concepts they are intended to measure. However, as is inevitably the case when limited measures are available, the significance of such measurement error is very difficult to assess.
l2 The quality-of-data measures were initially included in this company-level model, but none was significant in any model that also included measures of plant employment or company size. Thus, as suggested above, these measures can be interpreted as tapping dimensions of size or scale. Specifically, they tap whether or not the company was large enough to have publicly available data. The variance and covariance of these quality-of-data measures is picked up in a more interpretable fashion by the plant . employment and company size measures, which have relatively little missing data. Accordingly, the quality-of-data measures were excluded from subsequent analysis. tinction to its stated expectation. Since size, profit rate, and capital intensity are explicitly controlled in this model, it is not possible to explain this positive relationship in terms of the association of conglomerate linkages with large average scale, high profits, or capital-intensive production systems. Thus, at least at the industry level, conglomerate ownership appears to be associated with relatively high labor force earnings (cf. Bluestone and Harrison, 1982) . Market concentration, however, has a negative effect in this model, indicating that, net of company size and the other dimensions of economic structure, concentration reduces labor force earnings. This finding supports the interpretation suggested by Levinson (1967) that market concentration increases corporate power to avoid unionization and to undermine wage standards (see also Edwards, 1979; and Hodson, 1983) .
The earnings coefficients for the company and industry-level variables are similar but by no means identical. Many more industry-level variables than company-level variables have significant earnings effects. Plant employment, however, which has a leading role in the company-level model, is not significant at the industry level.13 At both the company and industry levels, the most important variables are ones of direct consequence for the organization of production, such as plant employment size and capital usage, rather than market variables pertaining to corporate survival and growth, such as concentration, profit rate, conglomerate domination, and foreign holdings. In other words, employee earnings appear to be more directly influenced by the organization of work l 3 In spite of the fact that many more industrylevel variables than 'company-level variables are statistically significant, the overall explained variances are very similar across models. This comparability results from the extremely powerful effect of plant employment in the company-level model. than by the organization of the product market (cf. Averitt, 1968; and O'Connor, 1973) .
The company-and industry-level measures are evaluated under controls for labor force characteristics in Models 3 and 4 of Table 2 . Under these controls, only plant employment size in the company-level model and capital intensity (and, to a lesser extent, foreign holdings) in the industry-level model still have significant direct effects. The existence of these net effects indicates that at least part of the earnings effect of economic structure operates in a manner other than through the selection of workers with specific characteristics or through the specification of a given level of labor demand. The key role of plant employment size and capital intensity in these net effects reinforces the finding that organizational rather than market factors are the central determinants of workers' earnings. Large organizational size may produce higher individual earnings through the necessity of implementing pay premiums to entice workers, of whatever individual characteristics, to work in the alienating conditions of large bureaucratically organized plants, or it may operate through the increased threat of worker collective organization to demand a larger share of corporate earnings. Capital intensity may have a direct earnings effect either because of the wage flexibility allowed by the increased productivity and lessened importance of labor costs in capital-intensive plants, or because of the increased power of workers to demand higher wages in these industries due to their heightened responsibility (Blauner, 1%4).
The labor force characteristics included as controls in Models 3 and 4 have large relative effects. This is especially evident in the case of gender and weeks and hours worked. The remaining labor force characteristics have effects more similar in magnitude to those of plant size AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW in the company-level model and capital intensity in the industry-level model.I4
The company-and industry-level measures of economic segmentation are evaluated simultaneously in Model 5 of Table 2 as well as in Model 6, which includes controls for labor force characteristic^.^^ The coefficients in Model 5 are similar to those in Models 1 and 2, which evaluate the company-and industry-level models separately. Plant employment size continues to have the dominant company-level effect and capital intensity continues to have the dominant industry-level effect. In Model 6, which introduces controls for t h e l a b o r f o r c e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , only company-level plant employment a n d industry-level capital intensity still have significant effects. These findings reinforce the important role of these two organizational variables noted above.
Company and Industry Sectors
The distribution of workers across company and industry-level economic sectors is -compared in Table 3 . Workers are distributed relatively equally across industry-level monopoly and competitive sectors but the company-level model places approximately one-third of the sample in the monopoly sector and two-thirds in the competitive sector. The distribution of workers as measured by tripartite sectors is somewhat more similar when compared across industry-and company-level models. However, a larger percentage of workers are identically classified by the dual-category company and industry models (67%) than by the tripartite models (59%). This problem of misclassification in the tripartite model is least severe in the local company sector, where 75 l4 The large effects of the labor force characteristics and the high percentage of earnings variance explained by Models 3 and 4 of Table 2 are also a consequence of the broad sample definition utilized. The sample analyzed includes both parttime and seasonal workers as well as full-time, yearround workers. This sample was selected in preference to a more narrowly constrained sample because of the importance of issues of underemployment in the economic segmentation literature (Gordon, 1972; Sullivan, 1978) . Results based on a sample restricted to full-time workers might conceal consequences of economic segmentation of major significance for the labor force as a whole.
IS In both Model 5 and Model 6 of Table 2 the increment to explained variance with the addition of the industry-level variables to the model containing the company-level variables (and vice versa) is significant beyond,the .001 level. In addition, the standard errors of estimates for the regression coefficients increase by no more than lo%, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in these regressions. percent of the workers are also classified in the local sector by the industry measure. The problem is most severe in the regional com-' pany sector, where only 25 percent of the workers are also classified in the regional sector by the industry measure.
The company-and industry-level measures of similar dual and tripartite models of economic sectors appear to tap somewhat different dimensions of social reality. However, these modest relationships may result from measurement error at one or both levels, as well as from differences in the meaning of these sectoral models at the company and industry levels of analysis. In particular, as results presented below suggest, there may be difficulties experienced in the measurement of an industry-level, regional-employer sector. The lack of close compatibility between these measures strongly suggests the need for careful and distinct conceptualization and measurement of economic segmentation at the company and industry levels.
The means of a set of labor force characteristics evaluated across the company-and industry-level dual economy models are presented in the top panel of Table 4 . These mean values show generally similar patterns across company and industry sectors, with earnings, tenure, unionization, weeks and hours worked, and the percentage of working-class positions all being higher in the monopoly sector than in the local sector. Conversely, percentage female and percentage autonomous workers are higher in the competitive sector than in the monopoly sector. Neither the company-nor the industry-level sectoral model provides a consistently superior measure in terms of explained variance (Eta2).
Examining the means of the labor force characteristics across tripartite company and industry models reveals a similar pattern of contrasts, with the regional sector generally registering intermediate values between the monopoly sector and the local sector. However, while the company-level classification results in large mean differences between the regional sector and the other two sectors, the industry-level classification does not reflect the existence of a distinctive regional sector with equal clarity. In particular, the mean values of many of the labor force characteristics are very similar in the local and regional industry sectors. This lack of sensitivity of the industrylevel model to distinctions between local and regional employers that are apparent when utilizing company-level measures may, in part, account for the re valence of dual schemes portant variables of earnings, gender, tenure, unionization, and weeks (though not hours) worked.
In summary, the company-and industrylevel sectoral measures are sufficiently unique so as to demand separate and distinct conceptualizations. The industry-level measure seems more compatible with the dual economy model of economic segmentation than the companylevel measure; however, when tripartite models are compared, the industry-level sectors account for significantly less variance in labor force characteristics than do the companylevel sectors.
among researchers who have relied solely on Earnings Determination Across industry as their unit of analysis (e.g., Tolbert Gender Groups et al., 1980; Oster, 1979) . In addition, the percentage of variance in labor force charac-Previous research on labor market segmenteristics explained by tripartite industry-level tation has indicated that the effects of ecosectors is consistently smaller than that ex-nomic structure may be somewhat different for plained by tripartite company-level sectors. men than for women (Bridges, 1980 ; Kalleberg This contrast is especially evident for the im-et al., 1981) . To investigate this possibility the earnings determination model developed above was evaluated separately for men and women. These results.are presented in Table 5 . .The second panel of Table 5 presents a statistical test for the significance of the contribution of the company-and industry-level economicstructure variables to the basic labor force model, of earnings, separately for men and women. The contribution of the company-level model is strongly significant for both men and women. The contribution of the industry-level model is strongly significant for men, but only marginally significant for women. The marginal significance of the industry-level model for women suggests that the earnings of women, relative to those of men, are less influenced by the role of economic structure in setting workplace environmehts that operate at the level of industrial divisions. This finding may provide insight int.0 why the industry-level sectoral model is less powerful in differentiating labor force outcomes than is the company-level sectoral model: the earnings of the female 40 percent of the l a b~r force are only marginally influenced by industry-level economic characteristics. The third panel of Table 2 reports Chow tests for the statistical significance of the total set ,of gender interactions with the economic-structure variables (Chow, 1960) .
These tests are significant at the .001 level for both the company-and industry-level models, indicating that the effects of the economicstructure variables, evaluated as a whole, differ for men and women at both the company and industry levels.
The only statistically significant gender contrast for the effects of the company-level economic structure measures involves plant ernployment size: the magnitude of this earnings effect is over three times as large for women as for men.16 The explanation for the larger earnings effect of plant size for women may lie in the bureaucratic nature of the organization of production in large plants. Overt bureaucratic rules make covert discrimination 'against minorities much more difficult (Edwards, 1979) . Based on the elimination of at least some l 6 Marginally significant effects of concentration (a positive effect) and 'foreign holdings (a negative effect) also appear for men, effects which are not in evidence in the analysis of the total sample or in the analysis of the female subsample. These findings are suggestive of further differences in the role of econbmic structure for men and women, but, given the lack of statistically significant contrasts between men and women for these effects, we must be cautious in any interpretation we give to these effects. discriminatory practices in bureaucratically organized companies, women may receive greater relative benefit from increased scale than men.
Turning to the evaluation of the industrylevel economic-structure lhodel across gender groups, it is evident that women receive relatively flat returns to industrial characteristics: none of the industrial characteristics is individually significant as an earnings determinant for women. Further, the set of industry-level characteristics, taken as a whole, has only a marginally significant effect on women's earnings. The only significant gender contrast in the effects of the industry-level variables involves the role of conglomerate domination. For men, industry-level conglomerate domination has a slight negative effect, as was originally hypothesized. This effect is not observed in the total sample due to the absence of a similar effect for women. It is also noteworthy that the positive earnings effects of capital intensity accrue entirely to men. This finding suggests that women may experience difficulties in securing a share of the economic rewards associated with the higher productivity and greater responsibility resulting from capital-intensive production systems. These difficulties may result both from a lack of collective power among women and from women's subordinate role as defined by the broader social system.' ' Form and McMillen (1983) offer a similar interpretation based on research that indicates that women's machine-related work is much more repetitive than men's and that women absorb much of the negative impact of technological change in the workplace.
A pattern of gender differences similar to that presented here is also reported by Kalleberg et al. (1981) , who find that size has greater earnings effects for women than for men and that capital intensity has greater earnings effects for men than for women (see especially Table 2 of that work). Additional, although less direct, support is also provided by Bridges (1980) , who reports that size is positively associated with female occupational l 7 A negative earnings effect of the industry-level measure of company size is also observed for men. The absence of a statistically significant contrast between men and women for this effect renders any substantive interpretation somewhat speculative. However. in combination with the greater effects of capital intensity for men, this finding may be seen as providing additional support for the conclusion that men derive economic advantage primarily from the industrial environment associated with capitalintensive production systems whereas women derive advantage primarily from the bureaucratic rules associated with large company size. composition within industries and that capital intensity is negatively associated with female employment.
CONCLUSIONS
Conceptually similar company-and industrylevel models of economic segmentation produce only roughly similar results in relation to the central labor force outcome of earnings as well as in relation to a number of other labor force characteristics. Correlations between similar constructs across the company and industry levels of measurement are modest, especially if these correlations are interpreted as r 'ability coefficients. Perhaps more important '$ , different company-and industry-level meadures are important in the earnings determination process. At the company level, organizational size appears to be the most significant determinant of earnings, while at the industry level, capital intensity appears to be the most significant determinant of earnings. To the extent that researchers calibrate their models on only one level, they may arrive at conclusions that are flawed by being conditional on the level of measurement of economic segmentation.
Across measurement levels, the economicstructure variables that are observed to be most significant in the earnings determination process represent characteristics of the organization of production. That is, organizational size and capital intensity specify definite characteristics of the workplace such as bureaucratization, the use of automated machinery, and so on. In contrast, market characteristics, such as industrial concentration and foreign holdings, while significant determinants of individual earnings, are decidedly less important than variables that tap the relations of production more directly.
When we compare company and industry sectors, the measures are again only moderately correlated and each appears to demand distinct conceptualization. As a tripartite measure, the company-level model appears to offer the superior operationalization in that it explains a greater proportion of variance across a variety of labor force characteristics. In addition, the industry-level sectoral measure appears to obscure important distinctions between regional and local sectors, leading to an overly simplistic two-sector model.
Nevertheless, the results presented here provide some support for the use of industrylevel data. Many of the industry variables have larger and more consistent earnings effects than their company-level analogues. It appears that industries continue to define important AMERICAN SOFIOLOGICAL REVIEW workplace atmospheres and standards that have not been rendered irrelevant by the continuing movement toward conglomerate forms of capital ownership.ls Analysis of the company-and industry-level economic-structure models across gender groups reaffirms the importance of gender distinctions for understanding the role of economic segmentation at the workplace. The positive earnings effects associated with large company size observed in the total sample accrue most strongly to women. The positive earnings effects associated with capitalintensive industrial environments observed in the total sample accrue entirely to men. These results reinforce prior findings in this area and indicate a reasonably stable pattern of effects that warrants substantive interpretation. For women in the labor force, the bureaucratic rules associated with large company size appear to provide a degree of protection from at least some discriminatory wage and earnings practices and are responsible for much of the effect of economic structure on women's wages. For men in the labor force, the heightened productivity and responsibility associated with capital-intensive production systems appear to offer substantial opportunities for securing higher earnings, opportunities that do not provide equivalent advantage for women.
These conclusions support the thesis that there is no ultimately correct level at which economic segmentation must be operationalized (cf. Baron and Bielby, 1980) . Industries and companies cross-cut each other and represent potentially very different influences on labor force outcomes; neither is reducible to the other. Industries are by no means homogeneous in regards to working conditions, man-machine relations, organizational structures, and so on; but neither are companies. Vast differences in these factors may occur within companies which operate across industry boundaries, within singleindustry companies, or even within a single plant (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Edwards, 1979) . Similarly, recent work on labor market segmentation indicates that internal labor markets may exist at either the industry, comIs These conclusions must be handled with a certain degree of reservation because of the problem of missing data for the company-level variables, which diminishes the variance and covariance of these measures. However, the industry-level measures are not without their own limitations. In particular, a high level of aggregation exists for many of these measures in the retail and service industries which, similarly, reduces their variance and covariance. (In these cases the value assigned to each industry was the mean of its industrial group as a whole.) pany, or occupational level Smith, 1983) .
Each level of economic organization deserves its own distinct conceptualizations; none can be considered prior in a theoretical sense. Thus, while researchers should take care to operationalize economic-structure concepts at the appropriate level and should attempt to develop data sources which cross multiple levels of economic structure, the findings presented here do not indicate that discourse on economic segmentation need be restricted to those privileged few who have access to data sets at the "appropriate" level of analysis. Economic segmentation occurs at the level of plants, companies, and industries, and it is not in the best interests of theoretical development to restrict our attention to only one of these levels.
The findings and conclusions presented here suggest that researchers must begin to develop their concepts about economic and labor market segmentation in terms of definite levels of economic structure. Specific dimensions may have differential importance across levels of economic structure, and the processes and relations which these dimensions measure require theoretical conceptualization at the level at which they operate. To continue to treat plants, companies, and industries as interchangeable units of measurement, rather than as conceptually distinct levels of economic structure, will only retard further theoretical development and research on labor market segmentation.
